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The Cold Big-Bang Cosmology as a Counter-example to Several Anthropic Arguments
Anthony Aguirre
School of Natural Sciences, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey 08540, USA
A general Friedmann big-bang cosmology can be specified by fixing a half-dozen cosmological
parameters such as the photon-to-baryon ratio ηγ , the cosmological constant Λ, the curvature scale
R, and the amplitude Q of (assumed scale-invariant) primordial density fluctuations. There is
currently no established theory as to why these parameters take the particular values we deduce
from observations. This has led to proposed ‘anthropic’ explanations for the observed value of each
parameter, as the only value capable of generating a universe that can host intelligent life. In this
paper, I explicitly show that the requirement that the universe generates sun-like stars with planets
does not fix these parameters, by developing a class of cosmologies (based on the classical ‘cold
big-bang’ model) in which some or all of the cosmological parameters differ by orders of magnitude
from the values they assume in the standard hot big-bang cosmology, without precluding in any
obvious way the existence of intelligent life. I also give a careful discussion of the structure and
context of anthropic arguments in cosmology, and point out some implications of the cold big-bang
model’s existence for anthropic arguments concerning specific parameters.
PACS numbers: 98.80.Bp
I. INTRODUCTION
Current fundamental physical theories and cosmologi-
cal models incorporate a number of ‘parameters’ or ‘con-
stants’ which could theoretically assume different values
while leaving the mathematical structure of those theo-
ries unchanged. Responses to the question of why any
given parameter/constant assumes the particular value
it does fall into three rough categories:
1. Like the laws of physics themselves, the value of
the parameter/constant in question is fundamental,
and simply a part of the nature of the universe
itself. Whether or not it ‘could have’ been different
is unclear but irrelevant, since it assumes a unique
value that is fixed in space and time.
2. The parameter/constant can ultimately be derived
from a fundamental physical theory with no free pa-
rameters. Thus the observed ‘parameter’ could not
have been different, as it is a purely mathematical
objects.
3. The parameter varies between members of a spa-
tial/temporal ensemble, of which the region of the
universe we observe is part of one member. The pa-
rameter not only could have been different but is
different in other ensemble members, and the value
we observe depends upon which ensemble member
we happen to inhabit.
Explanations of the third type have raised consider-
able interest in cosmology for two related reasons. First,
a number of inflationary cosmology and quantum cos-
mology theories explicitly fail to predict unique val-
ues for cosmological parameters such as the photon-to-
baryon ratio ηγ , the cosmological constant Λ or the am-
plitude of density perturbations Q; rather, these the-
ories yield only a probability distribution for the pa-
rameters, which take different values in causally discon-
nected ‘sub-universes’ [1,2]. Second, the observed values
of some parameters/constants (such as the cosmological
constant [3]) seem to require an incredible degree of fine
tuning if they are to admit explanations of the first or
second type.
This fine tuning might be avoided by explanations of
the third type, which allow for a decoupling between the
‘expected’ or ‘natural’ value of a parameter and the value
we observe, by incorporating the fact that some param-
eter values may preclude the existence of observers that
could measure those values. These ‘anthropic’ consid-
erations imply that the probability of measuring a given
value for some parameter is not simply given by the prob-
ability distribution of values assumed by that parameter
among members of the ensemble, but is modified by the
probability of observers arising in each member. Values
of parameters that are very different from the ‘expected’
values might then be explained as being typical values
among the set of values that allow the formation of ob-
servers.
Arguments of this sort have been used to explain the
observed value of Λ [3–9], ηγ [10], Q [11], the curvature
scale [12–14], and the density ratio of non-baryonic dark
matter to baryons ηdm [15]. Generally, these arguments
consider the viability of life in a universe in which one
of these parameters assumes a value ten times smaller
or larger than the observed values with all other param-
eters fixed. If the formation of observers is strongly sup-
pressed in each alternative universe, and if the a priori
distribution of parameter values is fairly flat, it is claimed
that the observed value has been explained. For exam-
ple, Tegmark & Rees [11] (hereafter TR) explain the ob-
served value of Q ∼ 10−5 by showing that galaxies could
not cool sufficiently if Q ∼< 10
−6, and would be so dense
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as to disrupt most planetary orbits if Q ∼> 10
−4.
Two substantial worries arise with respect to such ar-
guments. First, a parameter value differing by many or-
ders of magnitude (rather than just one) may correspond
to qualitatively different physical processes which allow
a rather different universe in which life could still arise.
Second, if more than one parameter is to be explained
anthropically, then several parameters must be varied at
once, and there is a risk that degeneracies will occur in
which changing one constant counteracts the adverse ef-
fect of changing another. This paper argues that these
two worries are substantial and serious, by developing a
specific set of cosmological models in which one or more
of the basic cosmological parameters can be altered by
many orders of magnitude, without preventing the for-
mation of observers (conservatively assumed to be similar
to us) in any obvious way.
To develop this argument, I first discuss in some detail
the logical structure of the ‘weak’ anthropic arguments
in question. I then discuss specific contexts (inflation,
quantum cosmology, etc.) in which they may arise. Next
I develop a general class of cosmologies based on the clas-
sical ‘cold big-bang’ (CBB) cosmology and argue that
observers like us could plausibly arise in these cosmolo-
gies. I then discuss several specific anthropic arguments
in light of the cold big-bang cosmology.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF ANTHROPIC
ARGUMENTS IN COSMOLOGY
Anthropic arguments concerning fundamental param-
eters in a theory generally are invoked to explain the
particular measured value of a given parameter, in re-
lation to the large range of other possible values that
it seems reasonable to expect that the parameter could
have assumed. The ‘weak’ form of the anthropic principle
(the only form this paper discusses) explains particular
values of some set of parameters using a two-part argu-
ment. First, the argument requires that the parameters
in question not only could have been different, but in
fact do assume a range of values in a physically realized
ensemble of systems, some of which contain observers ca-
pable of measuring the parameter, and all of which are
similar except for variations in the values of the param-
eters in question. The second part of the argument is
the self-evident statement that only systems capable of
producing observers can have their parameters measured.
Thus observers will never measure a parameter to have
a value which would preclude the existence of observers.
(For example, assuming that atoms are required for life
to exist, no living observer will ever measure a value of
the electron charge incompatible with the existence of
atoms).
The argument is simple, but immediately raises the is-
sue of to which parameters describing which physical sys-
tems the argument might be applied. For the purposes
of this paper, let us categorize parameters into three
groups. First are parameters which are known to vary
in space or time and may be derivable from more fun-
damental parameters; for example, the ‘solar constant’
or the ‘Hubble constant’. Second, the constants∗ used
in the currently-accepted fundamental physical theories
(the standard model of particle physics and general rela-
tivity) [16]. Third, the key parameters describing the cur-
rent ‘standard model’ of cosmology (defined presently).
This study concerns parameters in the third category,
and addresses anthropic arguments in cosmology which
attempt to explain their values.
A. The general argument applied to cosmology
I take the cosmological ‘standard model’ to be a
Friedmann-Robertson-Walker (FRW) big-bang cosmol-
ogy (i.e. the cosmology generated by solving Ein-
stein’s equations assuming large-scale homogeneity and
isotropy), characterized by a spatial curvature scale R
(evaluated at the Planck time, in units of the Planck
length), a photon-to-baryon ratio ηγ , an (electronic
†)
lepton-to-baryon ratio ηL, a ratio ηdm of non-baryonic
dark matter to baryonic matter (evaluated when both
are nonrelativistic), a cosmological constant Λ (in Planck
units), and a scale-invariant power spectrum of Gaussian
primordial density perturbations with an amplitude Q
on the horizon scale. This definition restricts the types
of cosmologies that can be considered, but encompasses
those for which anthropic arguments have been made in
the literature.
Anthropic arguments in cosmology have raised new in-
terest due to the possibility that the cosmological param-
eters are not uniquely derivable from more fundamen-
tal considerations, nor ‘fixed’ as part of the initial con-
ditions of the universe, but vary among ‘sub-universes’
with probability distribution P (α¯1, .., α¯N ). Here, the
set {αi} stands for some subset of {R, ηγ , ηL, ηdm,Λ, Q},
and dNP (α¯1, .., α¯N )/dα¯1..dα¯N is the differential proba-
bility that a randomly chosen baryon‡ resides in a sub-
universe in which the parameters αi(i = 1..N) take a
given set of values in the range [α¯i, α¯i + dαi]. (The
sorts of systems which constitute sub-universes are dis-
cussed below in § II B.) But P is not the probability
distribution of observed values of αi, which is instead
∗Excepting Λ (which is assumed to vary), I will hereafter
reserve the term ‘constant’ for parameters with fixed values.
†I assume for simplicity that the other species have lepton
numbers small compared to the electronic leptons.
‡Any number which is conserved during the cosmological
expansion could be used here.
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(by anthropic reasoning) proportional to P(α¯1, .., α¯N ) ≡
P (α¯1, .., α¯N )ξ(α¯1, .., α¯N ), where ξ(α¯1, .., α¯N ) is the total
number, integrated over time, of observers per baryon
that are capable of making independent measurements of
αi in a region of space in which the cosmological parame-
ters are given by α¯i. One can straightforwardly normalize
P to yield a true probability distribution, provided that
Pξ is integrable over the space of values attained by the
αi in the ensemble. (The method of defining probabil-
ities I have chosen is probably most similar to that of
Vilenkin [17]; other authors have formulated anthropic
arguments in ways that are similar in spirit but different
in detail.)
The function P will presumably follow from the (cur-
rently unknown) fundamental physics describing the uni-
verse as a whole. In this paper, I concentrate on ξ
(though I draw some conclusions about P ); determin-
ing ξ requires a criterion for the existence of an observer
and a method by which to calculate the density of such
observers for a given set of αi and their values α¯i. De-
termining what sort of physical configurations could give
rise to a being capable of measuring cosmological param-
eters is a rather difficult task which I will sidestep by con-
fining my criteria to those which are obviously essential
for the existence of life similar to humans. This assump-
tion is conservative in the present context in that it grants
the anthropic argument maximal predictive power, and
is tantamount to assuming that the frequency of inde-
pendent human-type observers greatly exceeds that of
all other types of observers the universe may produce.
The specific criterion adopted here is to require the for-
mation of a main-sequence star with a moderate fraction
of heavy elements such as C, N, O, etc. The star must
burn steadily and without significant disturbance (e.g.,
which would disrupt planetary orbits) for more than an
‘evolutionary timescale’ τev; I take τev = 5Gyr (the sin-
gle available observation for the timescale on which ob-
servers arise after the formation of a star). Adopting this
criterion, I set
ξ(α¯1, .., α¯i) =
∫ Zmax
Zmin
dZ
∫ ∞
τev
dτ
∫ tmax−τev
0
dt
dn(t, τ, Z; α¯i)
dt dτ dZ
.
(1)
Here, dn(t, τ, z; α¯i)/dt dτ dZ is the differential formation
rate (per baryon) at time t of stars with metallicity Z
which will live undisturbed for time τ ; tmax is the life-
time§ of the sub-universe in question, and Zmin and
Zmax define the range of allowed metallicities. Thus
ξ(α¯1, .., α¯i) is the total number of stars per baryon with
§tmax → ∞ is allowed for sub-universes which do not recol-
lapse, but I assume that each baryon is incorporated into a
finite number of stars.
Zmin ∼< Z ∼< Zmax that live ∼> 5Gyr in relative isolation,
in a sub-universe with cosmological parameters α¯i [18].
For example, in the observable universe ξ ∼ 0.01mp/M⊙
since about 1% of baryons form single stars a solar mass
or less.
Having defined the ingredients, I now discuss the
hope of what I will term the ‘anthropic program’.
The hope is that given a priori calculations of
dNP (α¯1, .., α¯N )/dα¯1..dα¯N and ξ(α¯1, .., α¯N ), their prod-
uct dNP(α¯1, .., α¯N )/dα¯1..dα¯N will have a well-defined
global maximum at some set of parameters α¯maxi . For
each parameter αk, one might then integrate P over the
other αis (k 6= i) to obtain a 1-dimensional probability
dP(α¯k)/dα¯k. If the peak surrounding the global maxi-
mum is very sharp, P(α¯k) can be used to define a range
of α¯k containing (say) 99% of the probability. If (and
only if) each observed value of α¯obsk falls inside its ‘highly
probable’ region, and if we assume that we observe the
value that a typical observer does, then anthropic argu-
ment has explained their values. In this case, for exam-
ple, the ‘natural’ value of Λ, would be reconciled with
its observed value (which if nonzero is many orders of
magnitudes smaller). Note that this procedure is very
different from the calculation of the conditional proba-
bility P(αk|α¯
obs
1 , .., α¯
obs
k−1, .., α¯
obs
k+1, .., α¯
obs
N ) of measuring a
single αk = α¯k with the other parameters fixed (i.e. by
their observed values). Making an anthropic argument
using such a conditional probability is only logically con-
sistent under the assumption that the anthropic program
will be successful, and that one can look at variations
in a single parameter while keeping others fixed at their
maximally probable values (presumed to be close to the
observed values).
The anthropic program, however, can fail in three clear
ways. First, there may not be any well-defined maximum:
there may be degeneracies among two or more param-
eters such that there are multi-dimensional surfaces of
constant P spanning a relatively large region of parame-
ter space. In this case, anthropic arguments still do not
provide a satisfactory explanation of the observed value
of those parameters in light of the large range allowed by
fundamental physics and anthropic constraints. Second,
the well-defined global maximum of dNP/dα¯1..dα¯N may
not lie near the observed values α¯obsi . This would imply
either a flaw in some element of the computation of P , or
that we live in region of parameter space with low prob-
ability, or that there is something fundamentally wrong
with the whole anthropic approach (e.g., that there are
not other sub-universes with different values of the pa-
rameters in question). Third, P may have two or more
well-defined local maxima. This would not be a prob-
lem in principle as long as one of the peaks was much
higher than the rest. But a similar and important prac-
tical difficulty can arise if ξ has multiple local maxima.
This is because anthropic arguments in the literature typ-
ically make simplifying assumptions regarding P , on the
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grounds that ξ must have a peak with a width which is
very narrow compared to the scale over which P varies
(e.g., [6]). But if multiple peaks (even narrow ones) oc-
cur in widely separated regions of parameter space, P be-
comes crucial and the implications of computations based
on anthropic reasoning become more ambiguous.
This paper argues that multiple regions of large
ξ do, in fact, exist in the set of parameters αi =
{ηγ , Q, ηdm, ηL,R,Λ}, by providing a cosmological model
in which many of these parameters can take quite dif-
ferent values than those we observe, without preventing
(according to the criteria define above) the existence of
observers. Before developing this cosmology and its im-
plications for the anthropic arguments, I will first outline
the cosmological contexts in which anthropic arguments
are typically made.
B. Contexts for cosmological anthropic arguments
Any attempt to implement the anthropic program de-
scribed above requires that the ‘universe’ (i.e. every-
thing that exists throughout all time) contains an en-
semble∗∗ of regions which may be treated as individual
FRW cosmologies. A number of such ‘meta-cosmologies’
have been proposed. For example, the ‘oscillating uni-
verse’ model consists of a series of finite-volume, finite-
age cosmologies (e.g., [19]). Here, each ‘big crunch’ is
followed by a new ‘big bang’ in which the parameters
αi might be newly drawn from the probability distri-
bution P (α¯1, .., α¯N )/Nb(α¯1, .., α¯N ), where Nb(α¯1, .., α¯N )
is the total number of baryons in a cosmology with
parameters α¯i. Then ξ(α¯1, .., α¯N ) can be straightfor-
wardly taken to be the number of stars which form (with
Zmin ∼< Z ∼< Zmax and lifetime > τev) in the cosmology
with parameters α¯i, divided by Nb. Current astronom-
ical data weighs strongly against a closed, recollapsing
cosmology, so this context is of value primarily because
it is fairly unambiguous.
The regions constituting members of the ensemble
could be separated in space rather than time. For ex-
ample, an infinite (or extremely large) universe in which
the parameters αi vary spatially could be partitioned into
finite regions†† of differing α¯i which are uniform enough
∗∗This is not an ensemble of imagined identical systems in
the Gibbs-Einstein sense, but rather a canonical or micro-
canonical ensemble of weakly or non-interacting subsystems
of a large or infinite physical system.
††The volume of space with a given set of αi need not be
finite, because the ensemble may contain an infinite number
of finite regions with the same αi. I assume that ‘edge effects’
associated with the boundaries separating these regions are
not important.
to be treated as individual FRW cosmologies with the
same initial time, each with a fixed number of baryons.
The relative numbers of regions described by FRW cos-
mologies with parameters α¯1i and α¯
2
i would then give
P (α¯1i )/P (α¯
2
i ), and probabilities as described in § II A
can be defined unambiguously as long as the universe
can be coordinatized in such a way that there is a time
after which no stars form. Open or critical globally FRW
universes with small density inhomogeneities would (for
example) satisfy these criteria.
Anthropic arguments can also be made in quantum
cosmology (e.g., [7,8]). Here the universe begins in a su-
perposition of states which ‘decoheres’ into an ensemble
of classical cosmologies with different properties. The
hope is that for a compelling initial condition, the wave
function can be represented as a superposition of (or
at least dominated by) FRW-type cosmologies with dif-
ferent values of αi. If these cosmologies were closed,
then the situation would closely resemble the first ex-
ample of the ‘oscillating universe’, and the probability
P (α¯1, .., α¯N )/Nb(α¯1, .., α¯N ) of a component of the ensem-
ble being described by parameters α¯i would be propor-
tional to the square of the amplitude of the term corre-
sponding to that cosmology in the initial superposition.
Note, however, that it is not entirely clear how to extract
probabilities if the superposition contains both open and
closed cosmologies, nor is it clear that the squared am-
plitudes can be straightforwardly interpreted as relative
frequencies in an ensemble of classical cosmologies. But
assuming that these problems are not fatal, quantum cos-
mology does provide a possible framework for anthropic
arguments.
Applying anthropic arguments to FRW cosmologies
embedded in an arbitrary global geometry is much more
difficult because there may not be a unique globally de-
fined initial time at which to begin the integration of
Eq. 1. This is the case in models of ‘eternal inflation’
in which inflation does not end globally (which would
provide an initial time for the subsequent FRW cosmol-
ogy), but always continues in some regions. The global
structure of the universe approaches an ensemble of ther-
malized regions separated by inflating regions [20], and
the values of cosmological parameters describing each re-
gion can vary throughout the ensemble. This is a natu-
ral context for anthropic arguments, but as discussed at
length in Ref. [21] (see also [22]), it is a subtle matter to
unambiguously define probabilities in such cosmologies
because the probabilities for many proposed schemes de-
pend strongly upon the coordinate choice: depending on
this choice, a t = 0 hypersurface can intersect one, many,
or no thermalized regions having different parameter val-
ues. Vanchurin et al. [21] propose a scheme that appar-
ently circumvents this problem and gives unambiguous
probabilities by calculating probabilities within any one
thermalized region. For this to work the parameters must
vary continuously in such a way that there is a finite
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range of values over which the probability has nonzero
measure, so that the (arbitrarily) chosen thermalized re-
gion will contain many sub-regions with different param-
eters spanning that range. Ref. [23] extend this scheme to
compute probabilities for situations in which parameters
take on different discrete values in different thermalized
regions.
III. THE COLD BIG-BANG COSMOLOGY
As described above, modern cosmology provides sev-
eral plausible (if speculative) contexts in which the uni-
verse could consist of an ensemble of regions, each de-
scribable as an FRW cosmology with different initial con-
ditions. The thesis of the present study is that regions
with quite different parameters may support life, thereby
greatly complicating or invalidating several anthropic ar-
guments. I support this thesis by developing a big-bang
type cosmology in which some or all of the parameters
ηγ , Q, ηdm, ηL,R, and Λ may differ by at least several
orders of magnitude from the current ‘standard model’
of cosmology in which they take approximate values of
|R| ≈ 2× 1029(1−Ω−ΩΛ)
1/2, ηγ ≈ 2× 10
9, ηL ∼ 1 [24],
ηdm ≈ 5 − 10, Λ ∼< 3 × 10
−122 (i.e. ΩΛ ∼< 0.7), and
Q ∼ 10−5.
A. Initial conditions
Consider an FRW cosmology with physical baryon
number density N(tI) at some initial time tI after which
the comoving baryon number is conserved, and at which
the photon-to-baryon ratio is small (ηγ ∼< 10) relative to
that we currently observe. Choosing N(tI) = 10
35cm−3
ensures also that nucleons are nonrelativistic, that known
baryonic species other than nucleons have decayed, and
that for ηγ ∼> 0.01 a state of nuclear statistical equi-
librium holds [25,26]. The expansion is dominated by
relativistic matter for
NI ∼> 10
39(η
4/3
L + η
4/3
γ )
−3 cm−3 (2)
or cosmic time
t ∼< 10
−4(η
4/3
L + η
4/3
γ )
2 s. (3)
A cosmology with ηL ∼ ηγ ∼ 1 could result from efficient
baryogenesis after an inflationary epoch, or might simply
be ‘assumed’ as the initial state for an FRW cosmology
(see § IV). Cosmic expansion dominated by nonrelativis-
tic matter will steadily decrease ηγ (though it is constant
for ηγ ≫ 1), while non-equilibrium processes may in-
crease it slightly [25–27].
I leave the rest of the cosmological parameters rela-
tively unconstrained, except for generally assuming ηL ∼
ηγ and ηdm ∼< 100 (both for convenience) and Q≪ 1 (to
avoid complications involved with significant primordial
black hole formation). I also assume that R and Λ−1 are
large enough for the expansion to be radiation- or
FIG. 1. Early evolution of a sample FRW cosmology with
(initial) ηγ = 1.0, ηL = 2.5 and ηdm ≪ 1. Baryon, photon,
electron and neutrino densities are given in g cm−3. The Jeans
mass is in solar units, the temperature is in units of 106 K,
and XHe and XZ indicate mass fractions of baryons bound
into Helium and into elements heavier than Lithium.
matter-dominated, until explicitly stated otherwise (see
§§ VII,VIII).
B. Nucleogenesis
The evolution of a big-bang cosmology with these ini-
tial conditions through the epoch of nucleogenesis is de-
scribed in detail in Ref. [26]. If ηγ ∼> 0.01 at N ∼
1035cm−3, the medium will be hot enough to reach nu-
clear statistical equilibrium, and will be dominated by
free neutrons and protons (their ratio depending upon
ηL). In this case a standard nucleogenesis calculation,
generalized to treat degenerate leptons, yields the prod-
ucts of primordial nucleogenesis at late times [26]. For
certain combinations of ηγ and ηL, nucleogenesis yields
a helium fraction of 25%, just as in the standard HBB.
However, for ηγ ∼< 10, nucleogenesis also produces heav-
ier elements (metals), yielding metallicity of Z ∼> 0.1Z⊙
for a 25% helium yield. By varying ηγ and ηL, almost
any desired yield of primordial helium and metals can
be obtained. As a particular example, for ηγ ≈ 1 and
ηL ≈ 2.5, the cosmic medium would emerge with ∼ 15%
helium by mass, and ∼ solar metallicity (see Figure 1).
Thus the cosmic medium in a CBB cosmology can start
out with the same level of enrichment as gas in the HBB
which has been processed by stars. (Of course the ratios
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of different heavy elements will be different in the CBB,
but C, N and O would be produced in abundance). Pri-
mordial metal synthesis is suppressed by either high ηL
or high ηγ .
C. Initial perturbations
Whereas in the standard HBB model structure for-
mation cannot begin until the time of matter-radiation
equality (∼ 1012 s), significantly lower ηγ allows much
earlier and more efficient structure formation. In mak-
ing the present argument I have assumed that there are
scale-invariant primordial density perturbations of am-
plitude Q on the horizon scale. It is interesting to note
that structure may form in CBB models even without
primordial perturbations (i.e., Q = 0), because of phase
transitions either in the QCD era [27] or (if ηγ ≪ 1) later
as the cosmic medium approaches the density of solid
hydrogen [28,29]; in either case the cosmic medium shat-
ters into ‘chunks’ with random velocities which induce
density perturbations of the form δM/M = (M/m)−7/6
on a mass scale M , where m is the chunk mass [30,31].
If these chunks survive they can directly coagulate into
the first structures, which heirarchically generate larger
ones [29]; if the chunks dissipate they leave behind the
density fluctuations which can see later structure forma-
tion [27]. The former case would lead to qualitatively dif-
ferent formation of the first structures; in the latter case
the general picture of early structure formation would be
affected quantitatively but not qualitatively. For simplic-
ity and continuity with the HBB case, and to investigate
general values of ηγ I will focus on the case of ‘primordial’
scale-invariant perturbations with δM/M ∝M−2/3.
D. Structure formation
The early history of star formation in a cold FRW cos-
mology of the described type has been worked out in
some detail by Carr [33]. The key point is that the Jeans
mass when it first falls below the mass enclosed by the
horizon, M iJ , is ∼ (2 − 10)(ηL + ηγ)
2M⊙ (Hogan 1982)
at t ∼ 104 s, rather than ∼ 103M⊙ at t ∼ 10
13 s in the
HBB. Stars in a CBB cosmology can therefore begin to
form soon after regions of stellar mass enter the horizon.
Density perturbations on scales smaller than the ini-
tial Jeans length are converted into acoustic waves they
enter the horizon and do not grow subsequently (hence
are suppressed relative to larger modes), therefore the
first collapsed regions have mass of order M iJ . Subse-
quently, larger and larger regions collapse hierarchically.
Carr argues that for objects below a critical massMc(Q),
the cooling time exceeds the free-fall time, and a single
object tends to form; for M > Mc fragmentation is ex-
pected and the collapsing object can form a cluster. For
M < Mc, Carr further argues that the successive hier-
archical collapse of regions will lead to a mass function
of protostellar clumps peaked near Mc. (Carr’s analysis
gives dN/dM ∝ M−1 where N is the number density of
collapsing clumps of mass M ; a Press-Schecter analysis
would give the qualitatively similar dN/dM ∝ M−4/3.)
For each clump,M provides an upper limit to the mass of
one or more stars which form from its collapse; for clumps
with M > Mc, the stellar mass function depends on the
details of the (presumed‡‡) fragmentation but objects of
M ≪Mc seem likely (since that is what appears to have
occurred in observed globular clusters and galaxies).
If we accept this basic picture, we may consider in
slightly more detail the early history of the example cos-
mology plotted in Figure 1, with ηγ = 1.0, ηL = 2.5
and ηdm ≪ 1. At t < 0.1 s, the Jeans mass is constant
at M iJ ∼ 100M⊙ and fluctuations below this mass are
strongly suppressed. Depending upon Q8 ≡ Q/10
−8, two
scenarios then suggest themselves.
First, if 10−3 ≤ Q8 ≤ 1, the first collapsed regions
of ∼ M iJ ∼ 10
2M⊙ cool faster than they collapse (see
Fig. 2), presumably forming stars of much smaller mass.
These primordial groups of stars collapse beginning at
time ∼ 109Q−1.58 s, and hierarchical clustering continues,
with masses ∼ 1010Q1.58 M⊙ collapsing around t ∼ 5Gyr.
In this scenario, depending on the details of fragmenta-
tion, a substantial fraction of the cosmic baryon mass can
form ∼ 1 M⊙ stars at very early times.
A second, qualitatively different scenario would result
from 10 ∼< Q8 ≤ 10
4, in which case masses well above
M ij ∼ 100M⊙ can form single systems (see Fig. 2). The
mass function of the first objects not expected to frag-
ment (by Carr’s criterion) will be dominated by objects
of ≈ 2000 − 5 × 106M⊙ which begin to collapse at cos-
mic time time 109 s. In the absence of significant rota-
tion, those of ∼> 10
5M⊙ should collapse directly to black
holes; the rest should form supermassive stars. Either
type of object will emit large amounts of radiation at
(probably) Eddington luminosity, converting a fraction ǫ
of its rest mass (or of a mass of accreted matter similar
to its own mass) into energy over a time te ∼ 4ǫ× 10
8 yr
(Rees 1978). Assuming te greatly exceeds the formation
time for the objects, this leads to a photon/baryon ratio
of
ηγ ≈ 5ǫ
5/4 × 1010. (4)
‡‡It is not entirely clear to the author whether or not frag-
mentation should, in fact, occur in such systems (see, e.g.,
the arguments of Layzer [34] and the recent simulations by
Abel, Bryan and Norman [35]); but as discussed below so-
lar mass primordial objects can be obtained without invoking
fragmentation if dark matter of sufficient mass and density
exists.
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Such a large energy release would probably evaporate
small structures and suppress further structure formation
until later, when larger masses go nonlinear and structure
can form much as in the HBB but with the remnants of
the initial supermassive objects as dark matter. The
FIG. 2. Cooling of primordial clouds in a CBB for
ηγ = 1, ηdm ≪ 1. The characteristic temperature T and
density ρ as masses of 100M100 M⊙ begin collapse yield an
absorption κ(T, ρ) using the fits of Bell & Lin [31]. Conden-
sations in the region indicated by vertical lines are optically
thick; others are optically thin. The shaded regions indicate
condensations for which the dynamical time exceeds the cool-
ing time.
same basic scenario should occur for any ηγ ∼< 50 and
10 ∼< Q8 ≤ 10
4, though later structure formation will
depend on Q8.
The presence of primordial dark matter can modify
this picture substantially, but the effect depends cru-
cially on the mass mdm of the dark matter particles,
and qualitatively on ηdm. Dark matter in a region of
a given size can only collapse if the dark particles free-
stream less than that distance during a dynamical time
of the system. This gives a dark matter ‘Jeans mass’
in terms of the temperature Tdm of the dark matter
particles, of MdmJ ∼ (kTdm/Gmdm)
3/2ρ−1/2. Consid-
ering only the dark matter contribution to the density
and assuming that the expansion is roughly adiabatic
since the formation of the dark matter, I find MdmJ ∼
4(mdm/1GeV)
−2M⊙. Consider the case ηdm ≫ 1. If
MdmJ ≪ M
b
J (where the latter is computed neglecting
dark matter), then the dark matter will just decrease
the initial (baryonic+dark) Jean mass, M iJ , by a factor
(1+ ηdm)
1/2 so that smaller primordial objects can form.
If, however, MdmJ ≫ M
b
J , then only primordial objects
of mass MdmJ or larger can form, since the Hubble drag
due to the dominant dark matter component prevents the
growth of smaller baryonic perturbations. Now consider
ηdm ≪ 1. Dark matter perturbations on a mass scale M
with MdmJ ≪ M ≪ M
b
J cannot grow because of Hubble
drag due to baryons, but will not free-stream away. This
is important because the baryonic jeans mass decreases
with time, reaching ∼ 1M⊙ at t ∼ 30 s in our exam-
ple cosmology. Without dark matter fluctuations on this
scale have been suppressed early on; but with dark mat-
ter, the small-scale fluctuations are preserved, and have
amplitude ∼ Qηdm/(1 + ηdm). Thus solar mass objects
(or smaller) can still collapse fairly early, as long as ηdm
is non-negligible. Since the collapse time scales with M
but MJ falls slightly more slowly than 1/t, these objects
will collapse after the larger objects of M iJ , but can still
survive if they form in regions that are underdense on a
scale M iJ but overdense on the solar mass scale.
Whether the first stars form as ∼ 100M⊙ groups or
as individual Jeans mass objects, they will soon find
themselves in a growing hierarchy of stellar systems, and
we must check that any nascent planetary systems or
proto-planetary disks are not disrupted through stellar
encounters. Using standard linear theory and spheri-
cal collapse, a mass perturbation of mass 100M100M⊙
turns around at roughly t ≈ 109Q−1.58 M100 s, and viri-
alizes at radius rV ≈ 10
15Q−18 M100 cm at density ρV ≈
5× 10−11Q38M
−2
100 g cm
−3. If such a clump fragments into
100M100/(1 + ηdm) protostars of solar mass, each pro-
tostar forms from a volume with characteristic radius
∼ 2 × 1014Q−18 M
2/3
100 (1 + ηdm)
1/3 cm, and can therefore
contract by a factor of ten or more to produce a proto-
planetary disk of ∼> 1AU for Q8 ∼< 1. The protostars
will have velocity dispersion ≈ Q1/2c, and the system will
quickly relax after a time
τrlx ≈ 10
9Q−1.58 M
2
100(1 + ηdm)
−1χ s, (5)
where χ ≡ (log 40)/[log 40M100/(1 + ηdm)] [36]. The
mean time between (proto)stellar encounters with impact
parameter b ≈ 1AU (which would disrupt the formation
or orbits of earth-like planets) is (see [36], p. 541):
τcoll ≈ 3.2 log
(
40M100
1 + ηdm
)(
Θ2
1 + Θ
)
τrlx, (6)
where
Θ ≡
GM⊙
2v2b
≈ 0.7Q−18 (AU/b). (7)
Thus τcoll ≪ 5Gyr, which would bode ill for any forming
planets. However, approximately 1/100th of the clus-
ter’s stars would evaporate each relaxation time [36], so
at least some stars will avoid collisions (by being evapo-
rated) for Q8 = 1, and the entire cluster will evaporate
before significant collisions occur if Q8 ≪ 1 (or ηdm ≫ 1).
This evaporation occurs as the relaxation of the cluster
moves stars into the high-energy tail of the Maxwell dis-
tribution, and does not require close stellar encounters
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to proceed. After the evaporation (or if formed alone in
its halo), a given (proto)star will likely find itself in a
larger mass condensation; but since τcoll/τevap increases
(logarithmically) with M , it cannot experience a planet-
disrupting encounter before this new mass condensation
evaporates, and so on.§§
E. Summary of CBB models
In summary, I have argued that for values of ηL
and ηγ of order unity, an FRW cosmology can begin
with solar or greater metallicity and with a Jeans mass
MJ ∼< 100M⊙ at very early times. Adding dark mat-
ter with mass ∼> 1 GeV yields objects with baryonic
mass M ∼< 100/[ηdm(1 + ηdm)
2]M⊙ and preserves den-
sity fluctuations in ∼< 1M⊙ regions. Structure forma-
tion depends crucially on the primordial perturbation
amplitude Q. For 10−11 ≤ Q ≤ 10−8 and ηdm ≪ 1
the first collapsed objects are formally unstable to frag-
mentation. In this picture there are three distinct ways
solar mass stars can form: first, by the fragmentation of
the first ∼ 100M⊙ objects; second, as solitary objects
in large dark matter halos (if ηdm ∼> 1); third as solar-
mass overdensities embedded in ‘void’ regions, when the
Jeans mass drops to a solar mass. These stars generally
form beginning at time ∼ 100 yr, and should be able to
survive without experiencing encounters which disrupt
their planetary systems, as long as Q ∼< 10
−8 and/or
ηdm ∼> 1. For Q ∼> 10
−7 very massive primordial stars
and quasars could form, inhibiting structure formation
until much later, when it would form as in the HBB (but
with Population III remnants as dark matter and with
arbitrary primordial metallicity).
In the notation introduced in § II A, these arguments
suggest
ξ(ηγ ∼ 1, 10
−11 ≤ Q ≤ 10−5) ∼ ξ(ηγ ∼ 10
9, Q ∼ 10−5),
(8)
where ξ is the number of solar mass stars per baryon,
and where the parameters not listed can be (but are not
necessarily) the same in both cases. While the argument
for M⊙ stars in a CBB is not incontrovertible, it seems
doubtful that a much stronger argument for M⊙ star
formation could be made in the HBB model without the
§§Nearby supernovae might also disrupt protoplanetary
disks. When the first supernovae explode at ∼ 107 yr, most
stars would be in clusters of ∼ 107Q
3/2
8
(1+ηdm)
−1 stars with
radii ∼ 100Q
1/2
8
pc, i.e. large globular-cluster type objects.
It is not presently clear whether or not this might be fatal
to forming planets. Note also that supernovae may also help
unbind clusters by removing gas.
benefit of observations of solar mass stars and the as-
sumption that the HBB model describes the observable
universe.
IV. ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE
ENTROPY PER BARYON
I have outlined a cosmological model with ηγ ∼ 1 ≪
ηobsγ ∼ 10
9, which appears to allow the formation of life-
supporting stars. This serves as a counterexample to any
argument which attempts to rule out cosmologies with
ηγ ≪ η
obs
γ using anthropic arguments. It is therefore
interesting to discuss how cosmologies with ηγ ∼ 1 might
come about, and what arguments have been forwarded
against them.
A major challenge in cosmology is to understand the
origin of the observed nonzero baryon number, given
that almost all models incorporate an early baryon-
nonconserving GUT phase and/or an inflationary phase,
both of which erase baryon number. One of the more at-
tractive scenarios for generating baryon number is the
Affleck-Dine (A-D) mechanism [37,38], which emerges
somewhat naturally from supersymmetric models, and is
compatible with the rather low reheating temperatures
that may be required by some inflationary models [10].
The simplest versions of this mechanism, however, tend
to generate ηγ ∼ 1 rather than the much greater ob-
served value. This finding led to a number of explana-
tions involving either a modification of the theory which
suppresses its efficiency [38], or entropy generation after
baryogenesis [39], or an anthropic argument such as that
by Linde [10]. I will discuss Linde’s argument first, then
make a few comments on the general possibility of low-
ηγ cosmologies since they are a crucial ingredient of the
remainder of the paper.
In Linde’s scenario, the universe is comprised of a vast
number of exponentially large and causally disconnected
regions carrying random values of the field φ˜, which de-
termines the photon-to-baryon ratio after A-D baryo-
gensis. ‘Typical’ domains with φ˜ ∼ ±mplank generate
ηγ ∼ ±1 but much more rare sub-universes could carry
ηγ ∼ ±10
9. Fixing Q, Linde argues that ηγ ≪ 10
9 would
lead to extremely dense galaxies, with (density)∝ η−3γ .
This could prevent the survival of planetary systems (see
also TR and § V below) and thus anthropically limit ηγ
to large values.
This argument is subverted in two ways by the (the-
oretical) existence of the CBB cosmologies outlined in
§ III. First, even if Q ∼ 10−5, low ηγ can lead to most
of the early cosmic medium collapsing into Population
III objects which generate entropy and can increase ηγ
to ∼ 109, thus restoring a semblance of the ‘standard’
picture of galaxy formation at much later times (see § III
and [40]. For a discussion of the possibility that our uni-
verse is of this type, see [26–29,33,41,42]). Second, if Q
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varies in addition to ηγ and Q ≪ 10
−5 is allowed, so-
lar mass stars can (plausibly) form primordially in the
CBB. While the stars may exist in clusters which are ex-
tremely dense, I have argued that these clusters would
evaporate into larger, less dense structures before stellar
collisions destroy planetary systems around their compo-
nent stars. Thus there is no clear obstacle to the gener-
ation of life-supporting stars in cosmologies with ηγ ∼ 1,
and the anthropic argument cannot explain the observa-
tion of ηγ ∼ 10
9.
A possible objection to the assumptions of this paper
is that it might be difficult to produce cosmologies with
ηγ ∼ 1 and ηL ∼ 1 in the ensemble. This is because
electroweak ‘sphaeleron’ interactions which violate B+L
but preserve B − L (where B ≡ η−1γ and L ≡ ηLB) are
in equilibrium at temperatures ∼> 100GeV and tend to
wash out B+L, giving B/L < 0 and requiring B−L 6= 0
for there to be any baryons left [43,44]. Generation of
large B − L is quite possible in Affleck-Dine baryogen-
esis, but negative lepton number can cause problems in
the CBB model because abundant antineutrinos lead to
neutron domination during nucleogenesis and hence to a
metal-dominated medium [27,33]. It is unclear whether
or not such a cosmology could support life like our own.
There are, however, at least three possible ways to avoid
this difficulty. First, Davidson et al. [45] have argued
that the A-D condensate can survive long enough (be-
fore decaying into baryons) to suppress sphaeleron in-
teractions below their critical temperature. Second, so-
called ‘B-balls’ can form from the condensate and protect
the baryon number from erasure [46], then later decay
into baryons. Third, since B − L is preserved family-by-
family, it is possible to obtain B/Le > 0 while B/L < 0,
by compensating for the positive electron lepton num-
ber (desired for neutron suppression) using large nega-
tive τ and/or µ lepton numbers. For example, setting
Lµ = B/3, Le = B/3 + 1 and Lτ = B/3− 25/13 yields,
after B + L erasure, B = 6/13, L = 15/13 and hence
L/B = 2.5 (see Ref. [43], p. 189 for details). Thus the
desired B/L can be obtained by tuning B/3−Li for each
family i. This is possible as long as weak interactions are
not fast enough to equalize Le, Lτ and Lµ.
Thus we see that given an ensemble of sub-universes
with different cosmological parameters, members with
ηγ ∼ 1 are quite possible, and anthropic arguments do
not rule out their observation even if all other paramters
are fixed. And as discussed below, if other parameters
vary, values of ηγ a few orders of magnitude different are
also allowed.
V. ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE
AMPLITUDE OF PRIMORDIAL
FLUCTUATIONS
A second anthropic argument which is directly con-
tradicted by the claim that a cosmology with ηγ ∼ 1
and Q ∼< 10
−8 can support life is the argument that
only Q ∼ 10−5 is anthropically allowed (TR). In essence,
TR argue that for Q ≪ 10−5 structures are too cold
and diffuse to cool efficiently into galaxies, whereas for
Q ≫ 10−5 galaxies are too dense for planetary systems
to survive for 5Gyr. However (and as noted by TR),
limits on Q depend on the other cosmological parame-
ters; for example, while lower Q impedes the formation
of structures that can cool, lower ηγ enhances it. Indeed,
the lower limit on Q of TR depends on η
4/3
γ if all other
parameters are fixed (their Eq. 11), so a very low value
of Q can be accommodated if ηγ is lowered in tandem.
Against this possibility, TR offer two comments. First,
that Q must be large enough that the characteristic en-
ergy of virialized structures exceeds the atomic energy
scale of ∼ 1 ryd, lest cooling be very inefficient. This
gives Q ∼> 10
−8 (their Eq. 6). But this assumes that
only atomic transitions can cool the gas; for the high
densities and low temperatures of the first objects in the
example cosmology of § III, molecular vibrational and ro-
tational cooling, and dust cooling, all with characteristic
energy scales orders of magnitude below atomic energy
scales, would be very efficient, particularly since the ob-
jects can have arbitrarily high metallicity. TR’s second
objection is that lowering ηγ increases the likelihood of
planetary disruptions, the frequency of which increases
roughly as η−4γ Q
7/2 (see TR’s Eq. 18 or Eq. 6 of § III
givenM100 ∝ η
2
γ). Like the cooling constraint, this allows
lower ηγ in combination with lower Q, but with a differ-
ent scaling, and the region of ηγ satisfying both cooling
and disruption constraints vanishes if Q is too low. But
as argued in § III, for sufficiently lowQ or high ηdm stellar
clusters should always evaporate before planet-disrupting
collisions can occur, removing the disruption constraint
and allowing very low ηγ and Q.
Thus it seems that while TR have provided plausible
arguments why Q could not vary by one or two orders of
magnitude without suppressing the formation of sun-like
stars if the other cosmological parameters are fixed at
their observed values, their calculations do allow some-
what different (by 1 − 2 orders of magnitude) values of
Q if ηγ is also somewhat different (this is another argu-
ment against a strict anthropic constraint on ηγ). Fur-
thermore, the arguments of this paper indicate that vari-
ations in Q (and ηγ) of many orders of magnitude are
allowed because qualitatively new physics becomes im-
portant.
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VI. ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE RATIO
OF BARYONIC TO DARK MATTER
While little is known about the nature of the (prob-
ably) cold, dark, (probably) noninteracting dark matter
that is postulated as part of the standard cosmological
model, it is known that it seems to have∼ 4−10 times the
mass density of baryons inferred from primordial nucle-
ogenesis constraints. For most dark matter candidates
there is no obvious reason why the dark and baryonic
matter densities should be similar, so one might appeal
to anthropic arguments for an explanation.
Linde [15] constructs such an argument to explain why
the axion-to-baryon density ratio could take a value of
ηdm ∼ 10 rather than the ηdm ∼ 10
8 expected if the ax-
ion field φ is in the natural range of ∼ 1016 − 1017GeV.
Assuming the other cosmological parameters – and in
particular ηγ and Q – to be fixed, Linde considers a hy-
pothetical sub-universe with φ ten times its ‘observed’
value, which leads to ηdm ∼ 400 − 1000. By his reason-
ing, structures should then be ∼ 108 times more dense
than observed galaxies and thus presumably incapable of
supporting intelligent life.
As discussed in § V, however, changes in the ratio
(1 + ηdm)/ηγ of matter to radiation can be largely com-
pensated for by changes in Q, since the virial density is
∝ Q3(1 + ηdm)
4/η4γ (TR, Eq. 5) and hence the number
density of stars is ∝ Q3ηdm
−3η−4γ (for ηdm ≫ 1). So in
Linde’s example, the increase in density due to the in-
crease in ηdm could be offset entirely by a decrease in Q
of a factor 10−2. According to TR’s analysis the struc-
tures would still be able to cool for this combination of
Q and ηdm (though for much higher ηdm – and hence
much lower Q – atomic cooling would fail). This weak-
ens Linde’s anthropic argument for low ηdm. The degen-
eracy seems also to allow for values of ηdm ∼< 1, since the
matter-to-photon ratio would only change by a factor of
∼< 10. Note, however, that ηdm ≪ 1 would qualitatively
change the HBB because structure formation may begin
to become ‘top down’ since fluctuations in the baryons
below the Jeans mass at matter domination (∼ 1015M⊙)
would be suppressed.
The CBB model can also form stars when ηdm ≪ 1
if fragmentation of primordial objects is effective, and
it is possible to construct a CBB model with ηdm ≫
100 by properly tuning other parameters. But because
variations about the standard HBB model can already
give cosmologies with ηdm ∼ 1000 or ηdm ≪ 1 that can
form stars efficiently (as long as Q can also vary), the
CBB scenario does not add anything particularly useful.
Because of the degeneracy between ηdm and Q, it
seems that the observed value of ηdm cannot be ex-
plained by anthropic means unless the probability dis-
tribution P is peaked more strongly toward higher val-
ues of Q than toward higher values of ηdm, i.e. unless
P (ηdm ∼ 1000, Q ∼ 10
−7) ≪ P (ηdm ∼ 10, Q ∼ 10
−5)
(where here and henceforth P (αk ∼ α¯k) should be in-
terpreted as dP (α¯k)/dα¯k, integrated over αk within an
order of magnitude of α¯k.) This can be seen either as
evidence against an anthropic argument for ηdm or, if
preferred, as a constraint on P (ηdm, Q).
VII. ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE
COSMOLOGICAL CONSTANT
Anthropic arguments have been forwarded a number
of times [3–9] to explain the vast difference between the
‘natural’ value of the cosmological constant (roughly the
inverse Planck length squared, l−2pl ), and its small or van-
ishing observed value of ∼< 3 × 10
−122l−2pl . Because the
energy density of clustering matter decays more quickly
than vacuum energy as the medium expands, in any FRW
cosmology with Λ > 0 structure formation ceases after
some time t(Λ; α¯i) at which vacuum energy dominates
the cosmic energy density (αi are the cosmological pa-
rameters other than Λ). It is argued that this gives an
anthropic ‘upper bound’ on Λ: if this time occurs before
the collapse of structures capable of forming solar mass
stars and planets, no observer like us can measure the
corresponding value of Λ. In the notation of this paper,
if the first structures form at cosmic density ρfs(α¯i) in
a cosmology with parameters α¯i, then ξ(Λ, α¯i) = 0 for
Λ ∼> 8πGρfs/c
2 (see Ref. [4] for a more precise criterion).
More sophisticated versions of this argument attempt to
calculate P(Λ; α¯obsi ), i.e. the conditional probability of
an observer measuring a value Λ, with the other αi fixed
at their ‘observed’ values. In these papers [5,6,9], P is
computed by calculating ξ(Λ; α¯obsi ) and multiplying by
an assumed P (Λ); they find a probability function which
peaks at Λ comparable to – but somewhat larger than –
the value indicated by observations.
It is simple to see how the anthropic upper bound to
Λ can change if cosmological parameters other than Λ
vary between members of the ensemble of sub-universes
postulated by the anthropic program. As noted, for ex-
ample, by TR, since ρfs varies with the αi (excluding
Λ), so does the anthropic upper bound to Λ. To make
this ambiguity concrete, consider the hypothetical cos-
mology with ηγ = 1.0, ηL = 2.5, Q ∼< 10
−8 and ηdm ∼< 10
developed in § III. In this cosmology, the first (solar
mass) stars may form at time tfs ∼ 10
9Q−1.58 s when the
cosmic density is ρfs ∼ 10
−12Q38 g cm
−3. Once this first
generation of stars (or star clusters) forms, subsequent
domination of the cosmic expansion by vacuum energy
should not affect the development of life (as also argued
by Weinberg [4]).∗∗∗ Allowing vacuum domination soon
∗∗∗Weinberg also noted the requirement that the stellar clus-
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after the turnaround of these first structures yields an
anthropic upper bound of Λ ∼< 4Q
3
8 × 10
−105 (in Planck
units), about 17 orders of magnitude larger than the up-
per bound on the observed value of Λ. In § III I argued
that ξ(ηγ ∼ 10
9, Q ∼ 10−5) ∼ ξ(ηγ ∼ 1, Q ∼< 10
−9), i.e.
similar numbers of life-nurturing stars per baryon might
plausibly arise in the example CBB model and in the
HBB. Weinberg [4] has conjectured that P (Λ) = const.,
therefore if we assume that independent of Λ the two
cosmologies have similar a priori probability, i.e.,
P (ηγ ∼ 10
9, Q ∼ 10−5) ∼ P (ηγ ∼ 1, Q ∼< 10
−9), (9)
Then it would be about 1017 times more likely for an
observer to find themselves in a cold cosmology with an
enormous Λ than in a cosmology like the one we observe.
Thus the anthropic explanation for a small value of Λ
fails if the ensemble of cosmologies comprising the uni-
verse contains cosmologies with values of Q and ηγ much
smaller than those we observe, unless the Λ−independent
probability of forming those cosmologies is many orders
of magnitude smaller than that of forming standard HBB
cosmologies.
VIII. ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE
CURVATURE SCALE
As for Λ, anthropic arguments have been invoked to
explain the difference between the ‘natural’ value for the
curvature scale of a Planck length (R ∼ 1), and its ob-
served value of R ∼> 10
29. This large difference has been
termed the ‘flatness problem’, and is one of the prime mo-
tivations for considering inflationary models. Anthropic
arguments can, however, still be made either in the ab-
sence of inflation, or within open inflation models.
If an arbitrary FRW cosmology is closed, a straight-
forward anthropic constraint on R arises from the re-
quirement that the time before the big-crunch must ex-
ceed the timescale for the development of intelligent life
τev ∼ 5Gyr.
For open cosmologies, anthropic arguments quite sim-
ilar to those concerning Λ have been formulated [12–14].
In simplest form, these arguments require that structures
capable of forming stars and planets form before the cos-
mic medium becomes curvature dominated; this gives an
anthropic lower limit onR. Curvature domination occurs
roughly when
R[a(t)/a(tpl)]lpl ∼ ct, (10)
ters be massive enough to retain metals generated in super-
novae. This requirement is unnecessary in the present case
because ample metals can be generated primordially.
where t is cosmic time, a(t) is the scale factor and lpl
and tpl are the Planck length and time. This yields the
anthropic constraint
R ∼>
(
teq
tfs
)2/3 (
tpl
teq
)1/2 (
c tfs
lpl
)
, (11)
where teq is the time when relativistic domination ends
(see Eq. 3), and tfs is the time when the first star-forming
bound structures form. For the standard cosmological
model with ηγ ∼ 10
9 and Q ∼ 105, the first structures
form at tfs ∼ 10
8 − 109 yr and teq ∼ 10
4 yr, giving the
constraint R ∼> 10
29.
If we allow very different values of Q and ηγ , then the
constraint weakens considerably. Considering the exam-
ple cosmology of § III in which stars form beginning at
t ∼ 109Q
−3/2
8 s and using Eq. 3 for teq, the constraint
becomes
R ∼> 10
24Q
−1/2
8 . (12)
Thus the curvature scale can be ∼ 105 times lower in a
cold cosmology, and measurement of a small value of R
and a cold cosmology will be much more probable than
measurement of larger R and a hot cosmology, in any
universe in which the a priori probability of hot and cold
cosmologies is similar and in which the a priori probabil-
ity distribution of R is peaked at small values (the latter
being the only situation in which anthropic arguments
about R in open cosmologies are useful).
IX. WHAT IF ηγ DOES NOT VARY?
The difficulties for the anthropic program pointed out
in this paper all depend on the assumption that low-
ηγ cosmologies exist in the ensemble comprising the uni-
verse which is posited in any cosmological anthropic ar-
gument. Can all of the difficulties be avoided if it is
assumed that ηγ is the same in all ensemble members?
Perhaps, but this is by no means clear. For exam-
ple (and to note yet another worry regarding the an-
thropic program), consider cosmologies with Q ∼ 0.01
and Λ ∼ 10−114. The cosmology would (by TR’s argu-
ments) be dominated by black holes, with (at best) ex-
tremely dense 1016M⊙ galaxies forming just after matter
domination and just as Λ−domination begins. This cos-
mology would be rather inhospitable to life, i.e. ξ(Q ∼
0.01,Λ ∼ 10−114)≪ ξ(Q ∼ 10−5,Λ ∼ 10−124). However,
differences in P might compensate: consider a universe
in which d2P (Λ, Q2)/dΛ dQ2 is flat (as per Weinberg’s
conjecture applied to Linde’s [1] fiducial chaotic inflation
model with V (Λ) = λφ4/4). Then P (Q ∼ 0.01,Λ ∼
10−114) ∼ 1016ξ(Q ∼ 10−5,Λ ∼ 10−124), and such cos-
mologies must produce only one life-supporting star (per-
haps by some extremely baroque and unlikely process)
per 1018M⊙ of baryons to compete with our cosmology.
It seems difficult to rule out such a possibility.
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X. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In § II A I denoted by ξ(α¯1, .., α¯N ) the number of solar-
mass, metal-rich stars per baryon that would form over
the lifetime of a universe described by an FRW model
specified by N parameters αi with values α¯i. If there
is a probability P (α¯1, .., α¯N ) that a given baryon finds
itself in a cosmology described by α¯i, the probability
P ≡ P (α¯1, .., α¯N )ξ(α¯1, .., α¯N ) should describe the proba-
bility that a randomly chosen observer measures the val-
ues α¯i. I then defined the ‘anthropic program’ as the
computation of P ; if this probability distribution has a
single peak at a set α¯pki and if these are near the measured
values α¯obsi , then it could be claimed that the anthropic
program has ‘explained’ the values α¯obsi of the param-
eters of our cosmology by showing that it is extremely
likely for typical observers to measure values very near
α¯pki ≈ α¯
obs
i , so that (assuming we are typical observers)
it is not surprising that we do.
In § III I developed a class of cosmologies in
which many of the αi take values quite different
from those deduced from observations. Setting αi =
{ηγ , Q, ηdm, ηL,R,Λ}, the observable universe can ap-
parently be described by an FRW model with α¯obsi =
{∼ 109,∼ 10−5,∼ 10,≪ 109,≫ 1030, ∼< 10
−56 cm−2}.
Observationally, we see that ∼ 1% of baryons form stars,
i.e. ξ(α¯obs1 , .., α¯
obs
N ) ∼ 0.01mp/M⊙. Let α˜i ≡ α¯i/α¯
obs
i
(i.e. the the αi in units of their observed values).
Then in § III I argued that similar values for ξ can
arise if α˜i ∼ {10
−9, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1} if supermassive popu-
lation III objects form primordially and heat the cos-
mic medium up to ηγ ∼ 10
9. Alternatively, solar-mass
stars might form primordially (with primordially formed
metals), plausibly giving similar values of ξ for α˜i ∼
{10−9, 10−4, 0, 1, 1, 1} (if primordial clouds fragment into
M⊙ stars) or α˜i ∼ {10
−9, 10−4, 1, 1, 1, 1} (if not). Fur-
thermore, structure forms very early in such cosmologies,
implying that ξ can be high even in drastically differ-
ent cosmologies such as (for example) that described by
α˜i ∼ {10
−9, 10−4, 0, 1, 105, 1017}. Less dramatically, but
quite illustratively, the calculations of TR show that one
can construct a whole 4-dimensional region of parameter
space in which ξ is within a few orders of magnitude,
defined by ξ(y, x, 1, 1, w, z) ∼(const) and parameterized
by x, where 10−3 ∼< x ∼< 100, 0.1x
7/8
∼< y ∼< 10x
3/4,
w ∼> 0.1yx
−1/2, and z ∼< y
−4x3}.
At minimum, the existence of many independent max-
ima and planes of degeneracy in ξ – widely separated in
parameter space – should be discouraging for proponents
of the anthropic program: it implies that it is quite im-
portant to know the probabilities P , which generally de-
pend on poorly constrained models of the early universe.
The hope that anthropic considerations would lead to
only a small allowed region of parameter space – i.e. a
small, sharp peak in ξ(α) – is not realized, and it seems
that anthropic arguments alone cannot simultaneously
constrain multiple cosmological parameters, even when
many assumptions that are quite sympathetic to the an-
thropic program are made.
Drawing further conclusions from the arguments I have
presented requires assumptions about P . Given strong a
priori confidence in a particular form of P , one could rule
out the anthropic program itself if that form of P favors
any of the cosmologies I have developed here which are
unlike our own; this might imply, for example, that we
simply happen to be ‘improbable’ observers and/or that
there are not other universes in which the parameters
vary as assumed, or that it is misguided to consider as
possible only ‘observers’ quite like ourselves. For those
committed to the anthropic program, the CBB cosmolo-
gies could be used constructively to constrain P : any
model in which P is very strongly weighted toward one
of the ‘alternative’ sets of α¯i is ruled out.
This paper has largely addressed anthropic arguments
concerning cosmological parameters, but many of the is-
sues raised here clearly apply to anthropic arguments
concerning more fundamental constants. The construc-
tion of specific counter-examples to these arguments (i.e.
cosmologies with very different fundamental constants
yet with observers), analogous to the CBB cosmologies
developed here, would seem to be an enormously more
difficult technical task and would require a much more
careful assessment of what could reasonably constitute an
observer [47]. This difficulty would, however, be greatly
exceeded by the difficulty of rigorously arguing that no
such alternative cosmology exists. [48]
In conclusion, I have noted that one cannot simultane-
ously anthropically explain the values of several parame-
ters if the argument for each parameter requires all others
to be fixed. It is possible, then, to explain at most one
parameter using such an argument. To explain more than
one parameter, more than one parameter must be varied
among the ensemble members, and degeneracies can arise
in the probability distributions. In the case that all six of
the parameters specifying the standard FRW cosmology
are allowed to vary, I find that it is possible to construct
a cosmology in which all of the parameters vary by (at
least) several orders of magnitude from their ‘observed’
values, yet in which stars, planets, and intelligent life can
plausibly arise. This greatly complicates, and reduces the
explanatory power of, anthropic arguments in cosmology.
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